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Persistent Trade Effects of Large Exchange Rate Shocks
ABSTRACT
Thispaper presents a theoretical basis for the argument that large
exchange rate shocks —suchas the rise of the dollar from 1980 to 1985 —
mayshifthistorical relationships between exchange rates and trade
flows. We begin with partial models in which large exchange rate fluc-
tuationslead to entry or exit decisions that are not reversed when the
currency returns to its previous level. Then we develop a simple model
ofthe feedback from "hysteresis"intrade to the exchange rate itself.
Here we see that a large capital inflow, which leads to an initialappre-
ciation, canresult in a persistent reduction in the exchange rate
consistent with trade balance.
RCh8Id 11n PaulR. Krugman Graduate School of Business Departnntof Economics 611 Uris Hall NIT
Colurrbia University E52-383A NYork, NY 10027 Carrbridge, W 02139The extreme strengtb of the US dollar in the early1980s has led
to substantjiilosse. omdrket positionby US—bQseci firms.
Conventional economic wisdom, and conventionaleconometric estimates,
suggest that a return of the dollar to more normal levelswill, after
some lag, reverse these losses. Many businessmenare, however, less
sanguine. They argue that the extent of the dollar'sovervaluation has
been so large and so persistent that inmany cases US firms have
abandoned markets altogether, or foreign firms haveentered markets
that had previously been US preserves. A fall of thedollar to its
1980 level, they suggest, will not reverse theseeffects. Once foreign
firms have invested in marketing, R&D,reputation, distribution
networks, etc. they will find it profitable to remain inthe market
even at a lower exchange rate. Once US firms have abandonedmarkets, a
mere return of the exchange rate to former levels willnot be enough
to make the expensive recapture of these marketsworthwhile. Following
the recent fashion in macroeconomics,we may describe this argument as
the view that there is "hysteresis" in theresponse of trade to
exchange rates (see in particular Blanchard and Summers1986).
Now the conventional, non-hysteretic wisdomon the dynamics of
trade response to exchange rates is basedon surprisingly little
systematic analysis. Distributed lags on the exchangerate are
universal in empirical work, and suchConcepts as the J-curve are part
of every international economist'svocabulary, yet little attempt has
been made to provide microeconomic foundations fortrade dynamics. So
the pessimistic view about the effects of dollardecline cannot bedismissed out of hand. It is nol diffcut to imagine that in the
esence of important sunk cost nnT bicreasing returns, a temporary
shock to the exchange rate could have a long term impact on
international trade. In particular, t seems intuitively plausible
that very large shocks, such as the one we have just gone through, can
have qualitatively different effects from smaller disturbances.
The purpose of this paper is to formalize the idea that large
shocks to the exchange rate can have persistent effects on
international trade. It builds on a previous paper by one of the
authors (Baldwin 1986). In that paper a simple model was developed in
which a foreign firm can enter a domestic market only by incurring a
once-for—all sunk cost. The paper showed that in this case a temporary
rise in the exchange rate, if sufficiently large, would induce
permanent entry by the foreign firm. This entry would shift the
subsequent relationship between imports and the exchange rate, so that
even if the exchange rate returned to its previous level the trade
pattern would not.
The present paper extends Baldwin (1986) in three ways. First, we
-
replacethe finite—horizon, perfect-foresight framework of the
original paper with an indefinite—horizon, stochastic setup. In this
setup we can impose stationarity on the exchange rate shocks, which
has the advantage of helping to clarify the meaning of persistence in
the behavior of trade.
Second, we examine the aggregated behavior of imports when there
are many industries subject to potential foreign entry. This is3
important to verify that the results of the single-industry case do
not get smoothed away Intheaggregate. For example. one might wonder
whether the distinction between large exchange rate shocks and small
is meaningful when there are many sectors, since a strong dollar from
one industry's point of view may seem weak from another's. What we can
show is that the results do not get smoothed away: even in a multi—
industry case, large exchange rate shocks have persistent effects in a
way that small do not.
Finally, we examine the feedback from entry and exit decisions to
the exchange rate itself. Clearly macroeconomic constraints imply that
a temporary shock to the exchange rate cannot lead to a permanent
trade surplus or deficit, The exchange rate must adjust so as to
preserve interteniporal budget balance. But the nature of this
adjustment needs examining. One view might be that a temporary
overvaluation will automatically be followed by a corrective
undervaluation that restores the intial market positions. We will show
that this is not necessarily the case. In the particular model we
/
consider,a temporary overvaluation is followed by a persistent
reduction in the equilibrium exchange rate, one which is enough to
restore trade balance but not enough to regain lost markets.
The models presented in this paper are, to say the least, highly
simplified. Furthermore, the approach is resolutely partial
equilibrium. Even where the feedback to the exchange rate is
discussed, we use a quasi—partial, "elasticities" approach to the
balance of payments. We commit these sins for the sake oftractability, and in the belief that thekeyinsights would SUrVIVeII
more satisfactoryframework.
1. The single—industry model
Consider an industry in which there is a single foreign firm that
is capable of supplying the domestic market. It would be possible to
consider the case of oligopoly, but for simplicity we assume that if
the foreign firm chooses to enter it will be a monopolist. The demand
for its product in any period t will be represented in inverse form:
(1) t =D(Xt)
where X is deliveries to the market and P is the price in domestic
currency.
The foreign firm is assumed to have a constant marginal cost in
terms of its home currency, and to be concerned with profits measured
in that currency. If the firm enters the US market, we can measure its
operating profits as
(2) ''tEtPtXt —cX
where Y is operating profits and E is the price of domestic currency
in terms of foreign. If the foreign firm is in the market at all, it5
willchoose X so a. : rnainjze \',sothat we C31.:'e;iesentthe
outcome of this cor1vc'ntona monopoly pricing proher a
(3) Y(E)
ClearlyY will be anincreasingfunction of E.
We next turn to the question of whether the firn wil actuallybe
in the market. What we will assume is that bothgetting into the
market and staying there are costly. To get into the market, if the
firm is not already there. requires an investment inmarketing,
reputation, distribution, and so on; we summarize all these costs asa
single entry fee N. If the firm is already in the market, it will
still have to spend something on all these areas to remainthere; we
summarize the cost of remaining in the market by a single niaintenanc
cost M. We will assume that N>M: it Costs more to enter a market than
to stay there. The difference between N and N is the sunk costaspect
of the model, and as we will see is key to the results.
In any given period, the firm earns a net revenue that isequal
to operating profits less entry or maintenance costs. Wecan define
net revenue R by
(4) Rt =0if the firm chooses not to be in the market
—
Mtif the firm was already in and stays there6
-ifthe firm was out andgetsin
Letus suppose that the firm is risi-—neutrai. Then its objective
is to maximize the expected present value of net revenue. Assuming a
constant discount rate 6, this objective is to maximize
(5) W =
Thefirm's strategy depends on the behavior of the exchange rate
E. Later in the paper we will introduce a model in which E's behavior
and the strategies of firms are jointly determined. Initially,
however, we will simply impose the assumption that E is a random
variable, i.i.d. across periods. The value of E will be assumed to be
revealed in each period before the firm makes its decision whether or
not to be in the market.
The i.i.d. assumption is clearly problematic from an empirical
standpoint. In reality exchange rate levels are clearly highly
serially correlated over time, to such an extent that in monthly data
they are not too far from a random walk. We therefore need to think of
our periods as being quite long. We believe that the basic insights
would go through as long as the exchange rate follows any stationary
process, e.g. an autoregressive one; however, without the i.i.d.
assumption the level of technical difficulty will rise sharply.
We are now prepared to consider the firm's decision problem. If
were no higher than M, this problem would be very simple: participatein the market if and only if thecurrentY(E) exceeds the entr Lost.
Becauseof the sunk cost aspect, however, entry now puts the firn in a
favorable position in later periods, and this option value needs to be
taken into account. On the other hand, the existence of a maintenance
cost means that the entry decision is not irreversible: the firm must
also take into account the possibility of leaving the market at some
future date.
To take the various possibilities into account, we can treat this
as a problem of dynamic programming. Consider first a firm that was in
the market last period. It has two options. It can remain in the
market: if it does so, it will have an expected present value
Y(E) -M
where V1 is the expected present value of futurerevenues of a firm
that was in the market the previous period, evaluated beforewe know
the exchange rate. Given our i.i.d. assumption on the exchange rate,
will be a fixed number. Its value is however contingent on the
strategy of the firm, and must be determined simultaneously with that
strategy.
Alternatively, the firm can drop out of the market. In that case
it realizes no current revenues. But it still has the option of
entering later, so its expected present value IsV0, where V0 is the
expected present value of a firm that was out of the market the
previous period.8
Siinflail':. fi.rr that was out last period w11 have the choice
betweenenteiin and staying out.Ifitentcr;tsexpected present
valuewill be
Y(E) —N—
whileif it remains out its expected present value will be V0.
The optimal strategy of the firm should now be apparent. If it
was out of the market last period, itshould enter if thecurrent
exchangerate exceeds a value we can label Otherwise it should
stay out. If the firm was in the market last period, it should remain
in unless the exchange rate falls below a value E0. Otherwise the firm
should drop out. The critical exchange rates and are defined





We still need to explain where V1 and V0 come from. The answer is
that they are the true ex ante expected present values of a firm
following the strategy we have just described, when the firm starts
out in or out respectively. Let f(E) be the density function of E.
ThenC)





To characterize the firm's behavior, it is necessary to solve the
recursive equations (8) and (9) simultaneously with (6) and (7) to
derivethe four variables E1,E0, V, and V0. We have not come up with
any specific examples that prove particularly enlightening. The main
result, however, does not depend on deriving a closed—form solution.
From (6) and (7), we see that
Y(E) —VIE0) = N—N>0
Since V(E) is increasing in E, this implies thatE1 >E0.The exchange
rate thatinducesentry is higher than the exchange rate that induces
exit.
The implications of this result can be illustrated using Figure
1. In the figure, we show import volume in this industry as a function
of the exchange rate. The import schedule has two parts. If the firm
is out of the market, imports are zero. This is represented by the
horizontal line along the axis, 00. If the firm is in the market,
imports will be an increasing function of the exchange rate. This is10
shownby the scheduITI Now thepoint is that thereis arange of
exchangerates. fron to E1, where either schedu].e could apply. If
the firm is not inthemarket, then as long as the exchange rate does
not go above E1;llInot enter. If it is in the market, then as
long as the exchange rate does not go below Ef it willstay in. Thus
the level of imports wli depend on history as well as the current
exchange rate.
Suppose in particular that the distribution of Eissuch that it
usually falls between E and E1, and only rarely lands outside that
range. Then for long stretches imports will either be zero or
fluctuate along II. Occasionally there will be a large exchange rate
shock, leading the firm either to enter or to leave; this will shift
the industry to the other segment of the schedule, leading to what
will appear to be a structural change in the exchange rate—import
relationship.
Notice that the persistence we find here is not captured by the
simple notion of a lag in the effect of the exchange rate. To see
this, imagine that the exchange rate were to rise from a level between
and to a level high enough to induce entry by the firm, then
return to its original level and stay there forever. (With random E,
we will of course not expect this to happen; thus this is purely a
thought experiment). If persistence were simply a matter of a lag, the
level of imports would eventually return to its original level as
well. In this model, however, the level of imports will remain
permanently higher.111
We have now seen how large exchange rate shocks can have
persistent effects in a single industry The next question we address
is whether the attribution of persistent effects to large shocks
Continues to make sense when we are concerned with the aggregate
behavior of a large group of industries with different
characteristics.
2. Many industries
When we discuss a single industry, it is natural to think of two
discrete states: the foreign firm is either in or out. When we are
concerned with aggregate imports, however, we must ask whether the
conclusions are going to be softened by the presence ofmany
industries with different characteristics. One mightsuppose that
there will always be some industry with a foreign firm juston the
margin of entry, and another industry with a foreign firm just on the
margin of exit. If this were the case, any exchange rate shock would
induce some entry or exit. This would vitiate our point that large
shocks will produce persistent effects that small shocks will not. So
it is important to ask whether the aggregation ofmany industries will
smooth out the results we derived for the single industry case. What
we wil]. do is show that for one interesting special case the aggregate
behavior will be similar to the behavior we have analyzed for a single
industry. We will then argue that in the more general case the result
will be only somewhat softened by aggregation.12
As a starting point we need to specify the spaceacrosswhich
industries are tob- distributed. Inthe model of Section 1 we found
that the dynamic behavior of an industry could he summarized by two
values: E1, the minimum exchange rate that will induce foreign entry,
and E0, the maximum exchange rate that will lead to foreign
withdrawal. These values inturndepend in a complex way onunderlying
parameters, but for current purposes all that we need to do is
classify industries by the result. Let us, then, represent each
industry as a point inE0, E1space, where the coordinates indicate
the critical values for that sector.
Now E0 and E1 may be said loosely to vary across industries for
two reasons. On one side is what we may think of as comparative
advantage. For industries where foreign firms have low costs relative
to domestic competitors, we might expect both E0 and E1 tobelow; for
industries where foreign firms have high costs, both would tend to be
high. To the extent that it is differences in comparative advantage
that mostly dominate the spread among industries, we would expect to
find that E1 and E0 were positively correlated. On the other side,
industries may vary in the degree to which their entry costs are sunk
——theeffect captured bythedifference N -Min our single industry
example. If industries had similar comparative advantage positions but
were very different in sunkness, we would expect to find and E1
negatively correlated: easy-in, easy—out "contestable" industries
would have both high and low E1.What we will do is concentrate firs' cnthe casewhere
comparative advantageis dominant. Specifically,we will assume that
if one iliduEtry has a higherE0 than another, italso has a higher E.
Thisimplies that it is possible to assign an index z to industries
suchthat E0 and are both increasing functions of z. For
simplicity let us further assume that these functions are continuous.
The resulting situation is illustrated in Figure 2. Theaxes of
the figure represent the Lo andE1 specific to each industry. Given
our special assumption, the distribution of industry characteristics
lies along an upward—sloping line like ZZ. Each pointon that line
corresponds to a particular industry. Note that ZZ lies everywhere to
the left of the 45degreeline. This reflects the fact thatE1 >
always, which in turn as we saw reflects the sunk cost assumption that
N>N.
Ineach of these industries the foreign firm may be in or out,
depending on the past history of the industry. There is, however, an
eauillbriumconfigurationwhich, once established, will be maintained
over time,itis the following: in all industries withz less than
somevaluethe foreign firm will be in, while in all industries
with z greater than I the foreign firm will be out. Once this
configuration is established, the effect of exchange rate shocks can
be wholly summarized by shifts in I. That is, the state of the whole
import sector will be summarized by a single number representing the
range of goods in which foreign firms are present.14
Tosee thatthis configuration will infactbe seif-eplicating,
weexamine the geometr:ofFigure 2.Suppose that initia1ythe
borderline industry is represented by the point A; in Zi those
industries corresponding to points on ZZ to the southwest of A the
foreign firm is in the market, while in all the industries to the
northeast of A the foreign firm is not in. ow jet there be an actual
realization of the exchange rate, which we can represent as a point on
the 45degreeline.
Clearlythere artthree possibilities. First, suppos the
exchangerate falls betweenand C. Then E is less than E1 for
industry A, and hence also less for all the industries to the
northeast of A. So no foreign firms enter. At the same time, E exceeds
E0 for A, and hence for all industries to the southwest of A. So no
foreign firms exit either.
Second, suppose that the realized E is above C,say atC'. Then
additionalforeign firms will enter, up to the industry corresponding
to A' .Nofirms willexit. So the form of the configuration will
remainthe same, but the location of the marginal industry will have
shifted.
Finally,supposethat the exchange rate is realized at a level
below B. The case will be symmetrical to the second case: the form of
the configuration will be retained, but the margin will shrink in.
What is important to note is that even though there isa
continuousdistribution of industries in terms of the exchange rates
that will make foreign firms enter or exit, it is not the case that15
there is always a firm on the margin of entry or the margin of exit.
On the contrary, there will always be a range of exchange rates for
which no firn either enters or exits. Thus when the marginal firm is
A, the exchange rate range BC leads to neither entry nor exit.
Geometrically, this range of no change exists because ZZ lies to the
left of the 45 degree line. This in turn, as we have already noted,
reflects the presence of sunk costs.
We have now seen that the dynamic behavior of a group of
industries can, under these special assumptions, be reduced to changes
in the location of the marginal industry. The next question is whether
the behavior of the aggregate of a group of industries will still show
the same kind of persistence as each individual industry. Asour
measure of the aggregate, we will focus on the total value of imports
from all industries.
It is clear that the total value of imports, which we will denote
as T, will depend not only on the exchange rate but on therange of
goods in which foreign firms are present. Thus
(10) T =T(E,)
Depending on the demand functions, T,'aE may be either positive or
negative; for our diagrams we will draw it as positive. Clearly,
however, T will be an increasing function of .
Nowconsider a case parallel to that which we used to examine
persistence for a single industry. Suppose that in Figure 2 theIC
exchange rate usually lies in the range P'C.Then ifthe marginal
industry IcA.the economy may go on for a time without any change in
the range ofindustriesin which foreign firms participate. As long as
thisis the case,there will appear to be a stable relationship
between the value of imports and the exchange rate. This relationship
is illustrated as AA in Figure 3.
But now suppose that one period's exchange rate happens to lie
outside BC, say at C'. We already know what happens: the marginal
industry shifts to A', so thatrises. If the exchange rate then
returns to DC, this shift will not be reversed. The effect will be to
shift the import—exchange rate relationship up, to A'A' in Figure 3.
The economy may then fluctuate for a time along this new schedule. It
will appear as if the economy has experienced a structural change.
This scenario is clearly very similar to what we saw in Figure 1.
The main difference is that AA and A'A' are not the only two possible
schedules in E,T space. There is in fact a continuum of schedules,
each corresponding to a different .Someof these schedules will be
sustainable only by exchange rates that occur only rarely, and the
economy will not usually remain on these schedules more than one
period. If sunk costs are large enough, however, there will be a wide
range of ,andcorreponding import schedules, that will tend to
persist as long as the exchange rate falls in its normal range. The
typical behavior of the economy will be to stay on any one schedule
for a while, until a large exchange rate shock pushes it "off the
edge" onto a different schedule. Thus the exchange rate—import17
re]tionshjJ will seem to alternate perioth' of stability withabrupi
structura)changesfollowing large shocks.
To derive this result we havereliedon an assumption about the
distributionof industries, namel;, thatLoand E1 move strictly
together. To conclude this section. we ask whetheraggregate imports
would still show this kind of behavior with amore general
distribution of industry characteristics.
Let us try to answer this by sneaking up on the issue. First,
lets suppose that there are two groups of industries, 1 and2. each
of which can be represnted by an upward-sloping schedule inE0, L
space. In Figure 4 we show these groups of industries as
Z121 and
The fact that industry group 2's schedule lies further from the
45 degree line than industry group .s indicates that sunkCosts are
more important for 2.
What can we say about the behavior of these twogroups'? Both will
exhibit some persistence of effects of large exchange ratechanges.
This effect will be more pronounced forgroup 2, where larger shocks
will be needed to shift the marginal industry. The difference will
complicate the description of dynamics. since we need to keep track of
two margins instead of one. Clearly, however, we will still be
justified in saying that in the aggregate the whole import side
exhibits persistent effects of large shocks.
If we can have two groups of industries, however,we can have
more. Thus we can approximate a two—dimensional distribution of
industries in E0,E1 space as finely as we like by a series of18
parallellines. Theworelines,the more complex thedetailof the
dynamics,buttheb pc:1fltwillnot change
Wehave seen then. thatthe peculiar behavior wehavederived
forasingle industry will not in general get averaged away in the
aggregate. When we begin to consider large aggregates, however, our
assumption of an exogenous distribution for the exchange rate begins
to become suspect. e would expect there to be some feedback from the
entry and exit decisions of firms to the exchange rate itself ——if
only because a country must sooner or later pay its way in
international trade. The final step, then, must be to try to model
this feedback.
3. Feedback to the exchange rate
To allow for feedback to the exchange rate it will be useful to
simplify the assumed structure of the economy in a somewhat different
way from that in the last section. We now assume that there are two
kinds of sectors: normal sectors, where none of these dynamic issues
apply, and hysteretic sectors, where they do. For the normal sectors
there will be a static relationship between trade flows and the
exchange rate. We will simply summarize everything that goes on in
these sectors by a reduced form relationship between the exchange rate
and the balance of trade,
(11)Bt
=B(Et)19
will assume that there is a largegroup of hysteretic import
sectors that are all perfectly symmetrical, i.e., that all havethe
same entry and maintenance costs, face the same demand, and havethe
same marginal cost. (There is no reason why could not also haveexport
sectors where domestic firms enter or leave: we Concentrateon imports
as an arbitrary choice among alternative simplificatjons). This allows
us to concentrate on the analysis of a representative sector. It also
lets us summarize the effects of past history bya sin1e number f,
the fraction of these industries in which the foreign firm isin the
market. The total value of imports from these sectors willdepend on
both the exchange rate and f:
(12) Tt =T(Et,ft) -
Inorder to assess the feedback from trade to theexchange rate.
we need a model of exchange rate determination. The approachwe will
take has two virtues: it is simple, and it forces theeconomy to
balance its trade in the long run. The vices of theapproach will be
immediately apparent and no doubt infuriating to those whoworry
seriously about exchange rate determination. We look forward to the
day when our points can be made in a less ad hocway.
Our basic approach is a partial equilibrium, elasticitiesone,
modified to take account of capital flows. Interestpayments on past
debt accumulations are ignored, so that the condition ofbalance of
payments equilibrium is20
(13) t - — = 0
where K is net capital inflow.
Now comes the awful part: we will assume that K is an i.i.d.
random variable. That is, random shocks to the capital account will be
the forcing variable that generates exchange rate movement and the
entry and exit of firms. The only justification for this approach is
its usefulness, which will soon become apparent.
The exchange rate must move to balance payments. We can express
the exchange rate as a function of net capital inflow and the fraction
of foreign firms that have entered import markets:
(14) Et =E(Ktft)
with the exchange rate increasing in both arguments.
Now let us consider the problem of a representative foreign firm.
We assume the following timing: at the beginning of a period the size
of net capital inflows K is revealed. Then all firms decide
simultaneously whether to enter or exit. Finally, the exchange rate
and everything else gets determined.
Suppose that a foreign firm is not in the market, and considers
entry. In the current period it will earn V(E) —N,where E depends on
both K and the number of other firms that enter. Having entered, it
will also have an expected present value next period. In contrast to21
the case we considered ir Section 1, however, the expectedpresent
value V1 will not in genera be constantover time, eventhoughK is
assumed i.i.d. .Thereason is that the number of firms feeds back to
the exchange rate, and thus the number of firms in the market by the
end of this period affects the expected value of being in the market
in the future. We must, then. think of a function
V1(f)
Correspondingly, a firm that is not in the market has an expected
'::'.V0(f)
Take the functions \',(f) andV0(f) as given for a moment. Then
the decision problem of a firm may be written as follows. A firm that
is out will enter if
Y(E(K,f)) —N&V1(f) >
Afirm that is in will exit if
Y(E(K,f)) —MV1(f) <&V0(f)
Now suppose that at the end of the previous period the number of
firms was Clearly there is a range of current values of K that
will lead no firms either to enter or exit. If K lies above this
range, firms will enter until there is no incentive for more to enter;
if K lies below this range, firms will exit until they are indifferent
between staying or leaving. LetK1(f) and K0(f) be the critical values
for entering and leaving the market. Notice that these are functions,22
notfixed values. These functions may be defined implicitly by the




Thelaw of motion for f can then be described as follows:
(17) =ifN(f) < <
K.(f)Mt if Mt >Ki(f_1)
=Ktit Mt <Ko(ft_i)
Wewill turn tothe interpretation of (17) in a moment. First,
however, we need to ask where the expected value functions V1(f) and
V0(f) come from. The answer, of course, is that they must be
determined simultaneously with the entry and exit functions K1(f) and
K0(f). We can imagine the following computational procedure. Start
with a guess at the functions V1(f) and V0(f). This will enable us to
solve (15) and (16), and thus to compute the behavior described in
(17). Once we have done this, however, we can ask what the expected
present value of a firm would actually be for any given f. We can then
use this computed function as a new guess at the expected presentvalue functions, and repeat. Art equilibrium will be a fixed ptintof
this computational process. This is an equilibrium defined a. ifixed
point in function space rather than in price space -—aconcept that
has been widely used in the work of Robert Lucas (see
Lucas (1981)). We will not attempt here to prove existence, let alone
uniqueness. Instead, we simply suppose that the functions V1(f) and
V0(f) can be determined, and that we therefore do in factend un with
thedynamics described by (17).
Now we turn to trying to make sense of these dynamics. Here we
can use essentially the same trick we used in Section 2, in a somewhat
different space. A particular value of has associated with it
values K1(f) and Ko(fti), the exchange rates that will induce
entry and exit respectively. It seems obvious that both will be
increasing in ft_i: the more firms in the market, the lower the
exchange rate for any given 1< and thus the higher the K needed to
induce entry or deter exit. Thus we can represent the range of
possible values of as an upward—sloping line in K0, K1 space.
This is illustrated as FF in Figure 5. Each point on FF has a value of
associated with it. Also, FF must lie to the left of the 45
degree line, because K1 >K0:a larger capital inflow is needed to
induce entry than to deter exit. Finally, parallel to our technique in
Section 2, we can represent a realization of the actual capital inflow
as a point on the 45 degree line.
From this point the analysis is exactly parallel. Suppose that we
start with a number of foreign firms in the market corresponding to24
point A inFigure .Thena capital inflow in the range BC will not
ied eithertoelitry or exit. A large capita] inf1o. however, such as
C' ,willlead additional foreign firms to enter. By examining (17). we
see that foreign firms will enter to exactly the extent that no more
would enter if the capital inflow remained at exactly the same level;
in other words, 1' will shift up to the level that corresponds to A'.
If the capital inflow then falls to the range BC, the new, increased
number of foreign firms in the market will persist. We can thus
imagine that for stretches of time there will be a stable number of
foreign firms in the market, but that at intervals that number will be
shifted by large capital inflows or outflows.
The interesting question, however, is what this says about the
behavior bf the exchange rate. As long as the number of firms in the
market remains fixed. the exchange rate will have a static
relationship with the capital inflow, fluctuating around some mean. A
large inflow (outflow) will at first produce a large appreciation
(depreciation). If the capital flow then returns to its initial value,
however, the exchange rate will not. Instead, following a large
capital inflow that provokes entry by foreign firms the exchange rate
will tend to fall below its original level. We can see this by noting
that f will rise, and this will tend to worsen the trade balance for
any given exchange rate.
The implied behavior of the exchange rate is illustrated in
Figure 6. For stretches of time the exchange rate will appear to
fluctuate around a constant mean. Then a large capital inflow or2
cmtfln: wii produce a temporary rnovenen of the exchange rnteiione
direction,followedby a shift of thmeanJIitheopposite direction.
It wj scent as if the initial exchange rate shock has produced a
structural change that permanently lowers or raises the normal leve]
ofthe exchange rate ——untilthe next. large shock.
Theimplications of this ana]ysis, if itisat all relevant to
the current US situation, are obvious. Massive capital inflows pushed
the dollar to very high levels in the early 1980s. If this was indeed,
as businessmen believe, a "large" shock that leads to entry by foreign
firms (and by extension, exit by US firms) the dollar in subsequent
years can be expected to fluctuate around a level that is persistently
lower than that of the 1970s.
4. Concluding remarks
In this paper, as in Baldwin (1986), we have presented simple
models (although with fancy equilibrium concepts) designed to clarify
our thinking rather than to be realistic. We can see from the models
that there is a reasonable case to be made for persistent trade
effects of large exchange rate shocks in the presence of sunk fixed
costs, and that this kind of trade persistence is not simply a kind of
lag in the response to the exchange rate. We hope that even this step
will help encourage economists to take the notion of hysteresis in
international trade seriously. Clearly, however, the next step must be
to make the analysis more operational. In our view, this will involve
three main tasks.26
The first taito make the models morreasonableat a micro
level. We would]ikFtodispensewith the Lid, assumption about th&
distribution of shocks, and in general sand away the rough edges of
the models to the point where they look as though they might apply to
actual industries. As recent work in the application of industrial
organization models to trade has demonstrated (flixit 1986; Baldwin and
Krugman 1986; Venables and Smith 1986), this will not be easy. The
truth is that the existing models of indutrial organization can be
made to look like real industries only by a Procrustean effort of
model modification. This is true even of static certainty models; it
will be even more true of the dynamic uncertainty models that are
vital here.
The second task is to get the macroeconomic linkages better
specified. We are of course concerned about our ad hoc exchange rate
approach, although we speculate that the results will not be too much
changed by a better mode here. Perhaps more important is the
modelling of investment decisions and the cost of capital. In the
models of this paper. entry and exit decisions are in effect invisible
investment decisions. Properly speaking, a decision to enter a market
is a kind of investment; a decision to abandon a market amounts to
capital consumption. If it is wrong to ignore feedback from trade to
the exchange rate, it is probably also wrong to ignore feedback to the
cost of capital.
Finally, we need some idea of how important these effects really
are in practice. Here the problem is one of both technique and data.27
The dynamic effects rmodelare not captured by tlie usual econometric
assumptions thdt behavior can be represented by rontinuous functions
and a fixed structure of leads and lags. Thus uncunveiitional
statisticaltechniques, and perhaps a reliance oncase—study—like
evidence, may be necessary. Furthermore, it is at least suggested by
our models that very large data sets may be required. Suppose that
really big exchange rate shocks occur only once a generation. Then
long time series may show a stable relationship between exchange rates
and trade ——yetthat relationship may change abruptly when a large
shock does hit. When it seems plausible that this generation's one big
shock has just happened, this is a disquieting thought.
In sum, then, the analysis presented here needs a great deal of
extension. We hope, however, that we have shown that the businessmen's
pessimism about the effects of a decline in the dollar is not
necessarily bad economics, and that we had better not be complacent
about the stability of econometric estimates of trade behavior.
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